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Posts Tagged ‘Canada’

A fighter for Canada

Posted by Picard578 on December 21, 2015

Introduction

Canada is a Western country that at the first look has most at common with Russia. It is huge, but vast majority of its population is concentrated in a narrow swath of land to the south, near the US-Canadian border. It borders United States to the south and west, while to the east is rest of the NATO and to the north is inhospitable Arctic, with its vast natural riches and strategic importance.

Defense of northern Canada depends mostly on three or four forward operating locations – fourth one is the only with permanently assigned squadron, and that one consists of transport aircraft. Only the far east and south of Canada have proper air bases. CF-18s are based in Bagotville to the extreme south-east and Cold Lake to the south-west. Extreme north is patrolled by long-range patrol squadrons using CP-140 Aurora aircraft; no fighter aircraft are present there on a continuous basis, despite primary mission of Canadian fighter jets being to patrol Canadian airspace. Main warning system is a chain of radar stations making up the North Warning System (DEW Line). Read the rest of this entry »

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Canada may cancel F-35 purchase

Posted by Picard578 on December 8, 2012

Federal Government cancels F-35 purchase

It seems that Canada has had it enough with F-35s cost increases, performance shortfalls and defense decisions that have nothing to do with actual defense.

After Chief of Defence Staff Thomas Lawson was called before the comittee, Canada has cancelled its F-35 purchase. Decision is especially important since Canada is one of members of consortium producing the F-35 strike aircraft. As such, its decision could make other members cancel or reduce their own orders of stealthy strike aircraft, starting a reduction avalance and burying F-35 programme.

Actual Canadian cost estimates for F-35s life cycle are 30 billion USD for 30 years. Evaluation which led to the selection of F-35 in the first place was a “paper evaluation”, made by comparing performance predictions – ones which F-35 is consistently failling to achieve, often by very large margins.

F-35s “ace card”, stealth, is overrated. F-35 itself is only LO against X-band radars; HF and VHF radars, as used by United States, Australia, China and Russia at least, can easily detect it over large distances. Even L-band radars (used on Russian PAK FA stealth killer) can detect it at long range. Non-LO aircraft, making no effort to hide, can rely on jammers for defense, which can be upgraded as threats evolve – stealth F-35, meanwhile, is furever stuck with its current RCS, which is dictated by airframe shaping and stealth coating.

F-35 can be detected at ranges of over hundred kilometers by fighters using QWIP IRST, even while subsonic, while its lack of maneuverability compared to Eurocanards, as well as threat aircraft, renders it unsurvivable against IRST-equipped fighters and SAM systems equipped with aforementioned stealth-detecting radars. Its huge IR signature puts it at risk against both airborne and ground IR detection systems, as well as making evasion of IR missiles far more difficult. Range performance is also nothing extraordinary, as its combat radius is lower than most rivals, including all Eurocanards, and Flanker variants.

It is incapable of generating enough sorties per day for its combat presence to actually matter against stronger opponents (as in, stronger than BiH), and many safety measures have been removed so as to reduce the weight increases. As such, it can be destroyed by a sniper rifle shot, and is very unsurvivable (and completely useless) in CAS role, as well as in any other role not involving destruction of large static targets. Its single engine also puts it at risk during ground attack operations.

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As I have checked it better, it seems that Canada cancelling F-35 purchase is not certain. However, it did come under review, and it seems that Italy may cancel, or at least reduce, their own F-35 order.

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On F-35 export “success”

Posted by Picard578 on November 3, 2012

I have often seen F-35’s export successes being used as a proof of aircraft’s quality. Is it really so? I decided to check situation.

It is known that United States have often used diplomatic pressure – even threats of military invasion – to secure arms contracts. That also seems to be case here. And it is not only a matter of US politicians and generals – who themselves are often led by political concerns – praising F-35.

US State Department memos have revealed that Norway has been persuaded through diplomatic channels to buy F-35. In 2010, Canada has announced decision to buy 65 F-35s for 9 billion USD. In fact, influence of Military-Industrial Complex in United States are such that US embassies lobby for F-35.

In Norway’s case, diplomatic notes have been revealed (excerpts brought by therecord.com):
“We needed to avoid any appearance of undue pressuring … but we couldn’t let stand the view that the choice didn’t matter for the relationship,”
While public US position was that buying F-35 would “maximise” Norway’s relations with United States
“In private, we were much more forceful,”
When F-35s sale to Norway was in danger of being cancelled, US diplomats in Norway have warned that
“High-level Washington advocacy on this issue is needed to help reverse this trend,”

On September 22, 2008, US Embassy in Norway has asked United States to warn Norway that future US-Norway relations may be harmed if Norway does not select F-35.

After winning Norwegian deal, same memo has praised US diplomatic involvement.

While official Canadian position was that F-35 has been chosen due to its capabilities, that must be brought into question, since after Norwegian success, United States have compiled a list of lessons that can be used to help secure future F-35 exports:
 active involvement of local US embassy, including Ambassador
 co-ordinating sales strategy with Lockheed Martin
 creating opportunities to praise aircraft – meetings by people of importance, often on lunches organized by US Embassy in respective country.

Even more damning, US diplomat – Kevin Johnson – who pushed F-35 on Norway is now based in Canada. His name also appears on document which lists lessons mentioned in paragraph above. In the same document, it was noted that SAAB has offered superior benefits for Norwegian industry compared to F-35, and price tag half of F-35s. Moreover, Gripen was also far better choice politically, playing on card of Norwegian neutrality and being a national corporation based in Norway’s neighbour, Sweden. Explaining decision, Norway has scorned Gripen’s performance, something never done by, and in opposing experiences of, other operators of the aircraft.

Later, it has been revealed that pressure has also been made by delaying export lincense for Gripen’s radar until after Norwegian decision.

Canadian politicians have engaged themselves in promoting the F-35. Canadian Department of National Defense has spent over 130 000 USD on tour designed to improve F-35s public image, and Industry Canada additional 55 000. (figures for 2011). There have also been visits by US politicians, as well as attempts to influence public opinion by articles – one, “The truth about those jets”, being written by retired General Paul Manson – also an ex-president of Lockheed Martin Canada. Canadian decision was, officially, based on competition held between 1997 and 2001. While it is true, competition in question was US 2001 competition which determined company to build F-35s. F-35 was also chosen before Canadian military has defined its requirements.

Many Canadian officials responsible for Canada’s decision to join Joint Strike Fighter programme are now lobbysts for Lockheed Martin. Also, over 70 Canadian firms have contracts signed with Lockheed Martin – and Lockheed Martin has said that it will not deal with these firms in future unless Canada buys F-35.

Canada needs to replace F-18s by 2016, yet F-35 will only be finishing its development phase that year.

Japan and Korea, meanwhile, have very strong political and military ties to the United States, and depend on US support in case of invasion by China. Korea has also been subject to pressure by United States: its request for upgrading F-16s radar has been denied.

While Korea has budgeted 120 million USD per aircraft, Air Force version of F-35 now costs at least 199 million USD in flyaway cost; cost difference will be covered by US taxpayers, and later presumably paid by increased maintenance costs.

Japan, meanwhile, has selected F-35 despite Eurofighter offering far better terms – 95 % of work was to be done in Japan, compared to 20 % for Lockheed Martin’s F-35 and 80 % for Boeing’s Super Hornet.

Wikileaks documents have shown that pressure by US diplomacy was important in securing F-35 deals in Turkey and Italy.

That hardly reveales decisions brought purely on basis of military concerns. Actually, since all F-35s export customers have close ties to United States (especially Israel), and many are not likely to see any situation where they might need it, not a single F-35 export order was made on basis of performance.

However, even traditional US allies – such as Japan and Korea – are saying that they might cancel F-35 order if costs rise further. F-35’s export costs are, as seen before, actually already below its actual flyaway cost, with difference being covered by US taxpayers. Even then, cost might turn out to be too high for Korea. Canada and Netherlands are also thinking about cancelling F-35 buys, and UK is looking at Naval Typhoon for their carrier, an aircraft that will be superior to F-35 by all possible measures.

As for F-35’s performance, it is nothing to praise. It is large, heavy, has high wing loading and low thrust-to-weight ratio – and that despite its huge engine. A such, it is sluggish in both turn and acceleration, and very easily spotted by modern-day IRSTs such as PIRATE, at distances of 100 kilometers or larger – even from front, where its IR signature will be smallest.

Decade into programme, only 21 percent of developmental testing has been completed – and even in full testing plan, many factors will remain untested. Ben Freeman has rightly called the Joint Strike Fighter programme a “phenomenal idiocy”. Even now, F-35s built are basically prototypes. Only 4 % of systems required to run airplane are a final version; and depending on wether F-35’s issues with helmet mounted display are solved, and what is causing them, it might end up without high off-bore capability; a sitting duck for almost any other fighter out there.

Low cost promise – an utter oxymoron when it comes to stealth aircraft – has relied on large US orders. United States, however, will be forced to reduce their order due to mounting costs. If US reduce quantity substantially – they already have and they will reduce it even more in future – per-aircraft costs are going to increase, calling in question export orders.

Only good thing for the West that may have come from programme is that Typhoons and Rafales will have easy time dealing with at least some Chinese aircraft, as Chinese stealth fighters will have similar problems as US stealth aircraft: large size, high weight, high cost and low sortie rate, as well as limited payload.

It isn’t just F-35 exports that are being pushed via threats. In 2003, Poland chose US F-16 deal over Eurofighter and BAE bids due to US threats of blocking Poland’s participation in NATO, EU and its relations with US.

(expansion of original article follows)

Reasons for situation described above are multifold. First, large F-35 exports will harm competition, particularly European firms (Eurofighter, Dassault, SAAB) which are offering cheaper and more capable aircraft. Second is, as already explained, long-term profit; while F-35 sales will cause a short-term losses to US (but not to Lockheed Martin) due to US Government subsidizing cost difference, in long term it will provide profits – United States are unwilling to share detailed knowledge of the system required for maintaining it, which means that aircraft have to be shipped to United States for upgrades and maintenance.

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How F-35 is destroying USAF (and other air forces)

Posted by Picard578 on October 8, 2012

F-35 is the latest technological wonder-weapon of United States Air Force. It is advertised as a “do-it-all” LO fighter, which is supposed to carry out a list of diverse missions, such as interception of enemy aircraft, fleet defense, tactical bombing of static targets, close air support, ground interdiction, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, acting as a forward air controller, carrying out SEAD and low-altitude penetration. It is a replacement for Harrier II, F/A-18, AV-8B, Sea Harrier and A-6. It is also pushed as a replacement for F-16 and A-10, despite vastly different roles and requirements.

As with so many “omnipotent” weapons, instead of doing everything equally good, it ended up doing everything equally bad. To explain: every of listed missions has its own set of specific, and often contradictory, requirements.

While Lockheed Martin and USAF are spewing bullshit, F-35’s designation as a “JointStrike Fighter” says it all; it was intended as a bomber and low-altitude penetration and strike aircraft, not as an air superiority fighter. Proof of that can be easily acquired by simply taking a look at F-35 itself: small wing and high wing loading are ideal for low-level penetration, by making aircraft less susceptible to air fluctuations common near the ground. However, fighter aircraft rely on a lift from the wing to turn, using excess thrust to overcome the drag and keep the energy during the turn; thus, good fighter aircraft has to have low wing loading and high thrust-to-weight ratio; exact opposite of what F-35 has.

Close Air Support aircraft has to be heavily armored, slow and armed with cannon in 27-30 mm range, in order to be able to fly close to the ground, identify targets on its own and pull off a precise Close Air Support. While “smart” bombs and missiles are assumed to be perfectly precise, reality is often different – guidance systems are easily jammed, and all complex weapons malfunction often. Thus CAS aircraft has to be able to go low and slow and attack targets with minimum of sensors and communications required. It also has to be able to loiter for a long time, providing continuous support to troops on the ground; with F-35s high fuel consumption, any notion of F-35 doing such thing is a wishful thinking. F-35 also cannot identify targets on its own.

Tactical bomber has to be able to carry relatively large amount of ammunition and strike as many (static) targets as possible. With F-35 being able to carry only four bombs at most, plus two AA missiles, it means that far more F-35s will be required as opposed to F-16s.

Air controller has to have two crew members; F-35 only has one.

Moreover, any aircraft has to be affordable enough to be procured in quantities large enough to carry out missions, at an affordable cost. At procurement costs that might be as high as 352,8 million USD per aircraft (from 2011 cost of 305 million USD per aircraft), and per-aircraft weapons system flyaway cost ranging from 197 to 238 million USD (for comparasion, Eurofighter Typhoon costs 120 million USD w.s. flyaway, and 200 million USD unit procurement), F-35 is anything but affordable. F-35’s maintenance cost can be estimated at 48 800 USD per flying hour, going from F-22s maintenance cost of 61 000 USD per flying hour. In short, F-35 costs up to 4 times as much to buy, and over 10 times as much to maintain as F-16.

All of that means that small F-35 force will be completely unable to maintain sufficient presence in the air in face of cheaper, simpler 4th generation aircraft.

F-35 has to rely on unproven dream of BVR combat to shoot down the enemy. BVR missiles did have a Pk of 50 % against “soft” (non-maneuvering, not using ECM) targets in a war where BVR force outnumbered the enemy. However, even in such circumstances, majority of BVR missiles were themselves fired from within visual range. Moreover, emerging technologies, such as air-to-air anti-radiation missile, will make radiating in war even more impractical than it is today; and any aircraft that uses active sensors to find targets is very easy to spot far before it can spot the enemy. Meanwhile, HF and VHF radars – which have already been used to detect aircraft in war (UK’s Home Chain in World War II) can as easily detect stealth aircraft, as can increasingly common IRST. Unique radar signal can also be used to solve IFF problem, so important in BVR combat – and enemy using air-to-air anti-radiation missiles can easily force everyone to shut down radars.

In both BVR and WVR, only chance F-35 has is to “launch and run”. However, it’s maximum speed of Mach 1,6 means that enemy fighters can simply eject BVR missiles, catch up with it and shoot – or gun – it down.

F-35 has also been compromised by different service requirements – for example, Marine’s VTOL requirement meant that fighter had to be short and fat, increasing drag. In the end, despite all compromises and accomodating performance penalties, three F-35 variants share only 30% of all parts. And much like F-111, F-35 can only serve as a bombing truck, being too underperforming and too vulnerable in any other role. Both aircraft are extremely flammable and have heavy lack of maneuverability, making them vulnerable to anti-aircraft artillery and SAMs. As a result, both can only fly bombing missions in low-threat areas.

F-35, like F-22, is limited to highly-visible, very vulnerable concrete air fields. Due to extremely hot and strong engine exhaust, STOVL/VTOL variant may never be able to fly from amphibious landing ships without destroying deck in the process.

It seems that realities outlined are being realized: UK may halve its F-35 buy, and other countries, such as Australia, Canada and Norway, are also looking for alternatives, despite all the PR, spin-doctoring, diplomatic threats and bribes Lockheed Martin has used to secure foreign sales. US Navy is also thinking about backing from the program.

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